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An overview of ideas and principles on equity valuation that emerge from Warren 
Buffet s letters to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
Thesis Chairman: Dr. Bruce Niendorf ’ /
Warren Buffett’s approach to equity valuation has developed from a straight 
quantitative approach, which was influenced by the late Dr, Benjamin Graham to an 
approach that relies on more qualitative analysis. This shift to the qualitative side was due 
to the writings o f Philip Fisher and Buffett’s co-chairman of Berkshire Charles Munger, 
Buffett studied under Graham at Columbia where he developed an extraordinary grasp 
of financial quantitative analysis as defined in the classic text Security Analysis. Buffett’s 
writings demonstrate his reliance upon two quantitative tools, which are the concept of 
intrinsic value as developed by Graham and Dodd, and return on owner’s equity,
Buffett’s inclusion o f qualitative factors in equity valuation represents a shift away from 
the Graham and Dodd value approach. An analysis of Buffett’s writings reveals the 
subject making a distinction between a mere business and what he calls a “franchises” , 
Buffett maintains that a franchise possesses a very specific set o f economic 
characteristics that separate them from mere businesses.
Furthermore, Buffett’s letters to the shareholders o f Berkshire Hathaway demonstrate a 
clear set o f corporate governance principles that provide a deeper understanding and 
explanation of the quantitative and qualitative tools employed by Berkshire management
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Chapter 1
An overview of Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
To understand Warren Buffett one must understand the influence the late Dr. 
Benjamin Graham o f Columbia University had upon Buffett. Buffett was drawn to 
Columbia by the reputation of Graham whom many consider to be the father of security 
analysis. Graham is perhaps best known in academic circles for his classic text. Security 
Analysis, which he co-authored with Dr. David Dodd who was also a noted lecturer at 
Columbia. In many ways Graham gave Buffett the tools to make his way through the 
vicissitudes and uncertainty of the engines of modern capitalism - the equity markets.
In the world o f finance and academia Graham was a far cry from the market 
specialists who acted without logic and reason. “Graham was a classical scholar, a 
student of Latin and Greek, a translator of Spanish poetry, and the author of a Broadway 
play.” ' According to those that knew him he possessed an intellectual curiosity and 
generosity that was unparalleled. In fact, a consistent theme that emerges throughout the 
resource material this thesis is concerned with is best represented from this quote from 
the Owner’s Manual, which is given to all Berkshire shareholders. Buffett states, “I 
benefited enormously from the intellectual generosity of Ben Graham, the greatest 
teacher in the history of finance, and I believe it appropriate to pass along what I learned 
from him, even if that creates new and able investment competitors for Berkshire just as 
Ben's teachings did for him.” Buffett has maintained this view throughout his career as he 
has attempted to use the chairman’s letter of Berkshire’s annual report to educate 
shareholders.
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Graham's contribution is the methodology that he brought to security analysis. He 
argued that investors should look for securities that were so cheap to essentially be free of 
risk.^ Graham equated this investment philosophy with searching for “cigar butts that 
might have a few more puffs in them,” His approach placed an absolute emphasis on 
quantitative factors such as earnings and assets. Furthermore Graham and Dodd 
developed the concept of “intrinsic value”, which will be discussed later. In short,
Graham and Dodd argued that an investor needs to look at the business behind the stock 
symbol and make rational, objective decisions based solely on a thorough analysis of a 
firm’s financial statements. Graham was fond of saying “investment is most intelligent 
when it is business like.”^
Buffett enrolled in Columbia’s business school during the fall of 1950 where he 
quickly became a dedicated follower of Graham. Under Graham’s tutelage Buffett began 
to hone his native gifts of intellectual honesty, sound reasoning skills and patience. Upon 
completing Graham’s course, Buffett was awarded the only A+ ever given by Graham."* 
Perhaps the greatest gift Graham gave Buffett is the belief that one need not follow the 
crowd. In fact, Graham often argued that by following the crowd one would surely 
encounter the road to folly. Graham was fond of saying, “You are neither right nor wrong 
because the crowd agrees or disagrees with you.”  ̂This view of the marketplace and the 
quantitative tools Graham armed Buffett with coupled with Buffett’s temperament and 
passion for investing set the stage for what many claim is the most extraordinary 
investment career ever.
Upon graduating from Columbia in 1951 Buffett returned to Omaha to work in his 
father’s brokerage firm. A short-time later he was offered a job by Graham to come back
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to New York and work directly for Graham as an analyst. After two years under the 
venerable Graham, Buffett was ready to strike out on his own. He returned to his native 
Omaha, Nebraska to start his own investment partnership, which was called Buffett 
Associates Ltd This was the beginning of Buffett’s long march to the annals o f 
investment history.
While working for Graham in the 1950’s Buffett stumbled upon a Massachusetts 
based textile firm called Berkshire Hathaway. Buffett was drawn to Berkshire because it 
met all o f Graham’s quantitative criteria. In fact, by 1962 the company’s stock price had 
fallen to below $8 although the company had $16.50 in working capital per share on the 
books.^ This investment had Graham written all over it. By 1963 Buffett’s partnership 
had become the largest holder of common stock in the company and by May of 1965 
Buffett was chairman of the executive committee and was essentially in charge of 
Berkshire.
Berkshire was at best a mediocre business and at worst a money losing pit that 
required large infusions of capital to stay afloat. Once Buffett took over, the ever- 
necessary infusions were reduced drastically for Buffett allocated the profits to 
enterprises that offered a higher return on capital Buffett began using Berkshire as an 
acquisition vehicle that has grown into one of the most watched companies in America. 
Soon after taking over Berkshire he purchased National Indemnity Company, Sun 
Newspapers of Omaha Inc , and Illinois National Bank & T rust/ These acquisitions 
couldn’t have been more different from the textile manufacturer that had become their 
owner. However, they all had one thing in common - they met Buffett’s criteria for being 
great businesses that offered excellent returns on equity.
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As Buffett’s investments through Berkshire began to blossom, the textile mills that 
comprised the original business began to wane. For example, in 1970 the mills produced 
$45,000 in profits while the insurance investments returned $2.1 million and the banking 
investments returned $2.6 million.* Buffett was reluctant to close the mills because they 
were large employers in the communities they were located in and he liked the 
management. From 1977, to the mills closing in 1985, Buffett repeatedly attempted to 
justify his position for keeping the mills open despite their drain on capital and the poor 
return on equity that Buffett craved. The following explanation was offered to the 
shareholders in the 1978 Chairman’s Letter. “We hope we don’t get into too many more 
businesses with such tough economic characteristics, But, as we have stated before: (1) 
our textile businesses are very important employers in their communities, (2) 
management has been straightforward in reporting on problems and energetic in attacking 
them, (3) labor has been cooperative and understanding in facing our common problems, 
and (4) the business should average modest cash returns relative to investment.” Another 
factor that was never mentioned in the chairman’s letters was Buffett’s desire to avoid 
being labeled a “liquidator”.
By July o f 1985 the textile operation was bleeding money and Buffett closed the mills. 
The mills required repeated capital infusions, which Buffett was unwilling to provide In 
his 1985 Chairman’s letter he summed up his view of the textile business rather cleverly 
“A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse -  not a remarkable mathematician 
Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a 
remarkable textile company -  but not a remarkable business.” While the mills were 
doomed the rest o f the Buffett portfolio was showing the world what a group of
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remarkable businesses could do. At the end of 1985 Buffett had given the shareholders of 
Berkshire an annual gain o f 23.2% in per-share book value.
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Chapter 2
The Qualitative and Quantitative tools Employed by Buffett
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Qualitative
In Berkshire’s Owner’s Manual, Buffett states, I set down 13 owner related 
business principles that I thought would help new shareholders understand our 
managerial approach. As is appropriate with “principles” they remain alive and well 
today.” When one reads the chairman’s letters, it is clear that consistent themes emerge 
from year to year with no variation and that Buffett’s desire to maintain the integrity of 
the principles that built Berkshire has been maintained. This is particularly true of the 
criteria that Buffett employs for equity valuation. The tools employed by Buffett have 
been modified over the years from a strictly Graham based quantitative approach to one 
that includes qualitative factors that look at the quality o f the intangible aspects of a 
business. This chapter will begin with a discussion of the qualitative characteristics 
Buffett looks for in businesses and then move into the quantitative tools that complete his 
investment toolbox
Buffett’s move away from the strict quantitative approach can be attributed to two 
men. The first is Phillip Fisher who was an original investment thinker and writer as well 
as a fantastically successful investor. Fisher is quoted as saying, “I don’t want a lot of 
good investments, I want a few outstanding ones This approach is contrary to the 
contemporary view in academia that supports portfolio diversification as opposed to 
concentration. This “eggs in one basket approach” is repeatedly referred to in the 
chairman’s letters and is consistent with Berkshire’s portfolio.
Through Fisher’s writings Buffett learned to place value on “scuttlebutt”. Fisher 
argued that one of the great tools the investor has available for selecting high-quality 
equities is to talk with the company’s competitors, suppliers and customers. Fisher
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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believed that a diligent investor could learn more through this method than through 
rigorous financial statement analysis. Buffett employed this method during a corporate 
scandal that brought American Express Corp’s stock price tumbling in the early 60’s. 
Buffett believed that American Express possessed a consumer franchise that gave it an 
extremely strong position in the marketplace. Buffett concluded that the company lacked 
significant competition in the credit card market and the traveler’s checks the company 
was known throughout the world for possessed a consumer monopoly. When the crisis hit 
American Express, Buffett visited grocery stores and banks and talked to managers and 
storeowners to see if the crisis had caused sales of traveler’s checks to drop off. He also 
visited his favorite Omaha restaurant and sat behind the register to determine if fewer 
customers were using their American Express credit cards aAer the scandal. Buffett 
concluded that American Express was not losing sales because of the crisis and that 
American Express was likely to weather the storm. Based on this information Buffett 
increased his position in the company.
The American Express investment is of particular interest because it represents a 
break from the quantitative Graham method to one that employs more of a qualitative 
approach. Buffett was beginning to recognize that there are intangibles that couldn’t be 
measured, which are crucial to differentiating a good business from a bad business. These 
qualitative factors became an integral part of Buffett’s analysis.
Charles Munger, Berkshire’s co-chairman, has also contributed to Buffett’s inclusion 
of qualitative factors in investment analysis. Munger is an interesting figure and many 
consider him to actually be the smarter of the two. After serving in World War II,
Munger so impressed the admissions committee at the Harvard Law School that he was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
admitted without an undergraduate degree. Munger shares Fisher’s view that qualitative 
factors are extremely important and offer invaluable information in assessing a 
company’s long-term economic viability. Consequently, since the beginning of their 
formal partnership in 1976, Monger’s qualitative approach has been directly infused in 
the investment process at Berkshire." This is not to say that quantitative measures have 
been ignored. As Buffett stated, “ I revised my strategy and tried to buy good businesses 
at fair prices rather than fair businesses at good prices.”"  This change caused Buffett to 
look for what he called “franchises” as opposed to businesses.
In the 1991 chairman’s letter Buffett gave his shareholders a primer on the distinction 
between a franchise, which he coveted, and an ordinary business which was doomed to 
be average at best. Buffett defined a franchise as, “An economic franchise arises fi'om a 
product or service that: (1) is needed or desired; (2) is thought by its customers to have no 
close substitute and; (3) is not subject to price regulation. The existence of all three 
conditions will be demonstrated by a company’s ability to regularly price its product or 
service aggressively and thereby earn high rates of return on capital.”"  He also pointed 
out that franchises can survive mismanagement because of their unique positions, 
although the enterprises profitability will be diminished.
The economic characteristics o f a franchise contrast sharply with those of a business, 
which Buffett basically defines as an enterprise that produces commodities. He argues 
that a “business” can only succeed if it can be a low cost producer, which is an advantage 
that is easily taken away." Furthermore, he maintains that a “business unlike a franchise 
can be killed by poor management .” The best example of purchasing a “business” in 
Buffett’s investment career is the purchase of the textile mills that comprised the original
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Berkshire. He failed to consider non-qualitative factors in making his purchase decision 
and it turned out to be one of the biggest money losers o f his career.
Buffett’s emphasis on qualitative factors can be seen in the purchases of Coca-Cola, 
Gillette, GEICO, and See’s Candy, which is a chain o f candy stores located throughout 
California. These companies were solid from a Graham perspective, but priced above 
Graham’s “margin o f safety.” Buffett realized that it was better to purchase these 
companies at a higher price because they possessed the characteristics o f a “franchise” as 
opposed to a “business”
Quantitative
Throughout Buffett’s writings two major quantitative tools emerge as the foundation 
of his analysis. The first is the concept o f “intrinsic value”, which Graham introduced 
him to, and the second is return on equity. There is nothing extraordinary in these 
concepts as they are relatively simple on the surface. However, the process of accurately 
determining intrinsic value is far from easy.
Graham and Dodd began their discussion on the topic by saying, “Intrinsic value is the 
investment concept on which our views of security analysis are f o u n d e d . T h e r e  is no 
doubt that Buffett took this to heart. Every chairman’s letter written by Buffett has 
references to intrinsic value. In the Berkshire Owner’s Manual, Buffett states, “Our long 
term economic goal is to maximize Berkshire’s average annual rate o f gain in intrinsic 
business value on a per-share basis.” Buffett defines intrinsic value as the discounted 
value o f cash that can be taken out of a business over time. This concept is relatively 
simple to understand although somewhat difficult to employ. Although, determining the 
intrinsic value of a company is a rough estimate, it still requires reasonably accurate
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forecasts o f earnings as well as the correct determination o f the rate at which the cash 
flows should be discounted.
Once the intrinsic value of a firm is roughly determined the analyst then waits for the 
stock price to fall below this value. In Security Analysis, Graham and Dodd suggest that 
the intrinsic or real value of companies change slowly, while the market price of 
securities sometimes fluctuates for no apparent reason other than irrational activities. This 
approach is predicated on the belief that financial markets aren’t efficient, which is 
contrary to the cornerstone of modern investment philosophy - the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH). The EMH states that stocks are always valued accurately and that it 
is a waste o f time to try and beat the market. Theorists argue that the financial markets 
and the analysts behind them are constantly evaluating companies and that all public 
information is factored into the price o f the stock. Therefore, it is fruitless for an investor 
to look for discrepancies in actual and market price because they don’t exist.
From 1977 to 1997 Buffett uses the chairman’s letter to rail against proponents of the 
EMH. In the 1987 annual chairman’s letter Buffett stated, “In my opinion, the continuous 
63-year arbitrage experience of Graham-Newman Corp., Buffett Partnership, and 
Berkshire illustrates just how foolish Efficient Market Theory is.” '^ Referring to the 
theorists that support EMH Buffett went on to say, “Observing correctly that the market 
was frequently  efficient, they went on to conclude incorrectly that it was always efficient. 
The difference between the two is night and day ” One astute author summed up the basic 
argument behind Buffett’s vigorous attack on EMH by writing, “Buffett would taunt the 
scholars with the evidence o f his career, and implicit in his taunts was a simple question: 
“If  you are so smart, how come I am so rich?” ’^
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In the 1977 chairman’s letter Buffett begins the discussion on corporate performance 
by stating, “We believe a more appropriate measure o f managerial economic performance 
to be return on equity capital.” Again this is a theme that emerges throughout the research 
material. It is no surprise that Buffett emphasizes ROE as this is an owner oriented 
financial ratio. Return on Equity is simply the return on the investment made by the 
owners -  the company’s shareholders. This tells Buffett how effectively a company’s 
management is employing the equity capital that the shareholders have entrusted with 
them. Buffett looks for companies with a long-term trend of providing good returns on 
equity while employing little or no debt. High returns on equity provide another bonus to 
long-term investors, which is the compounding effect of the retained earnings as it is 
assumed that the firm will continue to employ the owner’s capital at the historically 
demonstrated levels.
There is nothing extraordinary about the quantitative and qualitative ideas that have 
been introduced to the reader. However, these simple ideas are powerful concepts, which 
a diligent student of finance can employ. Perhaps the most interesting aspect is the 
development of Buffett’s thinking over the years. In the early days Buffett was strictly a 
quantitative investor. However, as the economic environment and his own thinking 
developed he began to consider qualitative factors that are contrary to his earlier views 
which were influenced by Benjamin Graham This development offers a glimpse of a 
mind that was disciplined enough to follow strict formulaic investing, but flexible and 
open enough to be influenced by new ideas. He seems to have found a middle ground that 
incorporates a strong emphasis on quantitative factors, which are reconciled with 
qualitative judgements that are made through good judgement and experience. Buffett has
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reminded us o f one of the great lessons in life, and that is the truth is often located 
somewhere in the middle.
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In many ways Buffett’s Letters are a gift to students o f finance and management. To 
simply focus on the principles o f finance is to ignore the larger part o f Buffett’s 
contribution. Buffett’s commentary exposes the reader to larger societal issues such as 
corporate citizenship, charities and inheritance issues as well as the equity markets role in 
society. The letters also provide the student with a view o f an encompassing and well 
reasoned philosophy that has been employed successfully.
Another byproduct o f the analysis o f  the chairman’s letters is the candor and original 
tone that he takes with his partners -  the shareholders o f Berkshire Hathaway,
Throughout Buffett’s career he has read thousands o f annual reports and in many ways 
felt dissatisfied with the way CEO’s spoke to their shareholders. This dissatisfaction 
drove Buffett to work hard to reach out to the shareholders and convey pertinent 
information that was provided with the intention of educating shareholders. Buffett’s 
desire to share knowledge and ideas with the public was largely stimulated by his 
experience with the late Benjamin Graham.
Graham introduced Buffett to the world of quantitative based equity analysis. It was 
through a detailed study o f the classic text Security Analysis, and the countless hours 
spent with Graham that Buffett came into his own. Graham’s intellectual generosity 
provided the fertile soil in which an extraordinary mind was able to grow. While Graham 
contributed more than any other person to Buffett’s intellectual development as an 
investor he is not alone as others have made substantial contributions. Buffett began his 
career as a strict Graham and Dodd value investor and slowly began to incorporate 
qualitative factors into his investment philosophy. This was due largely to the writings of 
Philip Fisher. Fisher argued that investors should talk with suppliers and competitors to
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obtain information about an investment’s prospect. Fisher maintained that this 
information was invaluable in assessing investments. Charles Munger, co-chairman of 
Berkshire, has also contributed to Buffett’s propensity to increasingly balance 
quantitative analysis with qualitative analysis. Monger’s role in Berkshire’s investments 
is considerable to say the least, although, his role is understated to the public because of a 
personal preference to avoid the spotlight. A similar project on Charles Munger would 
certainly be worthwhile and could provide valuable insight into the ideas produced by a 
great mind.
Perhaps the greatest lesson learned by studying the intellectual influences and ideas 
behind Buffett is his ability to learn and remain open to new ideas. Buffett’s intellectual 
development provides the student with a valuable lesson in the need to maintain 
principles, but at the same time demonstrates the importance o f remaining open to new 
ideas and methods.
However, it should be pointed out that Buffett has his detractors. Some in the 
academic environment and the financial press have accused Buffett o f taking advantage 
of opportunities the ordinary investor clearly doesn’t have. Many o f these opportunities 
stemmed from the hostile acquisitions o f the 1980’s. Buffett’s reputation as a long-term 
investor was seen as a god send by CEOs under attack by a hostile bidder. Consequently, 
CEOs under attack would offer Buffett enticing deals that were not available to the 
public. Linda Sandler of the Wall Street Journal wrote, “Many Wall Street investors say 
Mr, Buffett’s special deals amount to a kind o f gentlemanly protection game. In the old 
days, these investors say, corporate raiders such as Saul Steinberg got paid “greenmail” 
to go away. But Mr. Buffett is getting “whitemail” to stick around and hold
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management’s hand The criticism stems primarily from three investments Buffett 
made in 1989, The investments were in US Air, Champion International and Gillette. In 
all three cases, Buffett received a preferred convertible that was not available to the 
public.'^ In the 1989 chairman’s letter Buffett argued that he was responsible for 
securing the best deal for his shareholders and that the companies Berkshire took 
positions in would benefit in the long term by the presence of a stable long term 
shareholder. What is clear is that Buffett’s actions seem to contradict his disdain for 
special deals.
A discussion on Buffett’s ideas and Berkshire Hathaway would not be complete 
without including the 13 principles that Buffett has publicly stated for over 20 years. 
While most of these principles are outside the scope o f the quantitative and qualitative 
equity valuation methods this thesis is concerned with, they offer an important insight 
into Buffett’s philosophy and view of the candor and the ethics business leaders should 
employ. The 13 principles are the focus of the Owner’s Manual, which is given to all 
Berkshire shareholders. This Owner’s Manual is intended to provide shareholders with a 
view of the philosophy utilized at Berkshire and in so doing provides the reader with the 
most encompassing and concise view of world-class corporate governance available. The 
13 principles are as follows,
1) Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership, Charlie Munger and I 
think of our shareholders as owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners 
(Because of the size o f our shareholdings we are also, for better or worse, controlling 
partners.) We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner o f our business 
assets but instead view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own 
the assets.
2) In line with Berkshire's owner-orientation, most o f our directors have a major portion 
o f their net worth invested in the company. We eat our own cooking.
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3) Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to 
maximize Berkshire's average annual rate o f gain in intrinsic business value on a per- 
share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of 
Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate 
o f per-share progress will diminish in the future - a greatly enlarged capital base will 
see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average 
large American corporation.
4) Our preference would be to reach our goal by directly owning a diversified group of 
businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. 
Our second choice is to own parts o f similar businesses, attained primarily through 
purchases o f marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and 
availability o f businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given 
year's capital allocation.
5) Because of our two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the 
limitations o f conventional accounting, consolidated reported earnings may reveal 
relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners 
and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also 
report to you the earnings o f each major business we control, numbers we consider of 
great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about 
the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them.
6) Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation 
decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of 
earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to 
purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces 
us since entire businesses (whose earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for 
double the pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely 
unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be 
fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.
7) We use debt sparingly and, when we do borrow, we attempt to structure our loans on 
a long-term fixed-rate basis. We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over­
leverage our balance sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the 
only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to 
policyholders, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually 
large portions o f their net worth to our care. (As one o f the Indianapolis "500" 
winners said: "To finish first, you must first finish.")
8) A managerial "wish list" will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not 
diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term 
economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money what
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we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying 
your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.
9) We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the 
wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers 
shareholders at least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has 
been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth 
grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.
10) We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we 
give. This rule applies to all forms of issuance - not only mergers or public stock 
offerings, but stock- for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as well. 
We will not sell small portions o f your company - and that is what the issuance of 
shares amounts to - on a basis inconsistent with the value o f the entire enterprise
11 ) You should be flilly aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial 
performance: Regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good 
businesses that Berkshire owns. We are also very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses 
as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good 
about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation 
mistakes that led us into such sub- par businesses. And we react with great caution to 
suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by 
major capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling and the advocates 
sincere, but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is 
about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial 
behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We 
would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in that kind of 
behavior.
12) We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses 
important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts 
that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less. 
Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be 
inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness 
when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when 
reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: The CEO who 
misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.
13) Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our activities in marketable securities 
only to the extent legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and 
subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas 
are. Therefore we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This ban extends 
even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks 
we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say "no 
comment" on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.
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In the Owner’s Manual Buffett provides a detailed discussion o f these 13 principles 
that guide Berkshire However, it is not practical to include that discussion within the 
confines o f  this thesis. It is clear that an awareness of these principles reveals a deeper 
understanding of the methods that Buffett employs and demonstrates the interrelationship 
between some of the ideas that have been presented in these pages. One would be well 
served by seeking to understand the implications and benefits o f the aforementioned 
principles.
Throughout the research in this project a host of extraordinary minds, personalities, 
ideas and relationships were encountered. However, the friendship between Buffett and 
Graham stands out above them all. Therefore the author believes that it is fitting that 
some of the last words be theirs. When Graham died Buffett wrote a eulogy for the 
Financial Analysts Journal and the final words in the eulogy spoke volumes of both men. 
Buffett wrote, “A man named Walter Lippman wrote of men who plant trees that other 
men will sit under. Benjamin Graham was such a man.”
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